California Packing Corporation, a corporation v. State Tax Commission : Brief of Defendant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
California Packing Corporation, a corporation v.
State Tax Commission : Brief of Defendant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alfred Klein; Grant A. Brown; Alvin I. Smith; Attorneys for Defendants .
Unknown.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Gt I t 
INDEX 
Page 
Preliminary Statement 1 
Questions Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
I. The Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act Dele-
gates Authority to the Commission to Depart 
from the Statutory Allocation Formula in Order 
to Apportion the Net Income Fairly and Equit-
ably Attributable to This State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
II. The Evidence in This Case Justified the Commis-
sion's Actions in Departing from the Statutory 
Allocation Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
III. The Action of the Commission Was Not Unrea-
sonable nor Arbitrary, and, Therefore, It Did Not 
Deprive the Plaintiff of Its Property Without 
Due Process of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
IV. The Plaintiff Cannot Claim That a Departure 
from the Statutory Allocation Formula Is a Vio-
lation of Its Rights Unless It Sustains the Bur-
den of Proving That the Method of Apportion-
ment Adopted by the Commission Is Unconsti-
tutional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
V. The Inclusion of Financial Revenue from Intan-
gibles in the Measure of the Corporation Fran-
chise Tax Is Statutory and Constitutional. . . . . . . 37 
Summary ........................................ 42 
INDEX-Continued 
TABLE OF CASES 
Page 
Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton vs. State Tax Commission, 
266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82 .................... 26, 34 
Colgage vs. Harvey, 296 U. S. 442, 56 S. Ct. 252 ...... 41, 42 
Commonwealth vs. Lorillard, 129 Va. 74, 105 
S. Ec. 683 .................................. 10, 11 
Corn vs. Fort, 95 S. W. (2d) 620 ................ 13, 14, 15 
Gorieb vs. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675 ............ 33 
Hans Rees' Sons vs. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 
51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 79 ............... 26, 27, 34,36 
Kresge, S. S. vs. Bennett, 51 F. (2d) 353 ............ 36, 37 
Lawrence vs. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 286 
U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Matson Navigation Co. vs. State Board of Equalization, 
297 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 553 .................... 40, 41 
Maxwell vs. Kent-Coffey Manufacturing Co., 294 
N.C. 365,368 S. E. 397 ...... 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35,36 
People ex rei Studebaker Corporation of America 
vs. Gilchrist et al., State Tax Commission, 
155 N. E. 68, 244 N.Y. 144 ...................... 15 
Porto Rico Mere. vs. Gallardo, 6 F. (2d) 526 .......... 9, 10 
Pump Hairpin Manufacturing Company vs. Emmerson, 
258 U. S. 290, 42 S. Ct. 305 ...................... 33 
Roberts & Schaefer vs. Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50, 
46 S. Ct. 375 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Shaffer vs. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221. ....... 24, 25 
State Revenue Commission vs. Edward Bros. Co., 
194 s. E. 505 ............................ 11, 12, 13 
INDEX-Continued 
Page 
Travis vs. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, 
252 U. S. 60, 40 S. Ct. 228. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Underwood Typewriter Company vs. Chamberlain, 
254 U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 45 .............. 25, 26, 33, 34 
United States Advertising Corporation vs. Lynch, 
1 Fed. Sup. 302 .......................... 15, 16, 17 
United States Glue Company vs. Oak Creek, 
247 U.S. 321, 38S. Ct. 499 .................... 22,23 
Western Telegraph Co. vs. Query, 144 S.C. 244, 
142 S. E. 509 ................................. 10 
Wheeling Steel Corporation vs. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 
80 L. Ed. 1143 .............................. 39, 40 
REFERENCES AND AUTHORITIES 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 
Section 80-13-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Section 80-13-21 (8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Section 80-13-47 ............................... 31 
"Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract" by 
Roswell Magill, 44 H. L. R. 953 .................. 8, 9 
"Multiple Taxation by the States" by Robert C. Brown, 
48 H. L. R. 420 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
National Tax Association, May 1931 ................. 36 
"State Jurisdiction of Income" by Henry Rottschaeffer, 
44 H. L. R. 1082 .............................. 7,8 
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CALIFORNIA PACKING COR-
PORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 6049 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The statement of facts and the recital of statutes as 
detailed in the plaintiff's brief present a good discussion 
of the facts and law before this court. For the purpose of 
this brief it will be necessary for certain facts to be added 
to those of the plaintiff's brief, both in this preliminary 
discussion and later in the presentation of the argument. 
During the two years prior to 1935, which is the year 
in question, the plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as the 
2 
company, operated in Utah as a parent corporation which 
disposed of the products of two subsidiary Utah corpora-
tions, the Utah Packing Company and the Morgan Canning 
Company. In filing corporation franchise tax returns, a 
separate accounting basis was used by each corporation to 
report the net income arising in this state and attributable 
to that corporation. The plaintiff, in the year 1935, con-
solidated the operations of all its subsidiaries in the United 
States and elsewhere into one corporation, and instead of 
filing returns to the State of Utah based upon the separate 
operations of each company within this state, filed one 
return based upon the consolidated operations. This change 
resulted in the difference of opinion as to the proper method 
of allocating to the State of Utah the net income from busi-
ness done in this state. 
Since the inception of the Utah Corporation Franchise 
Tax Act, it has been the conviction of the members of the 
commission that to administer properly this tax law, there 
was a higher duty delegated to them than to sit idly by and 
to accept the returns as filed by corporations doing business 
in this state. Certainly, the legislature intended this com-
mission to collect the tax on the net income on all business 
done in the State of Utah. Guided by the provisions of the 
statute imposing this tax, and limited by the boundaries of 
the Constitution of Utah and of the United States, methods 
have been pursued to carry out this intent of the legislature. 
Plaintiff has seen fit, because of the national and in-
ternational nature of its operations, to consolidate its sub-
sidiary corporations and to change its methods of account-
ing. As a result of such change, its records apportioned to 
s 
the State of Utah less income from its activities in this state, 
than, in the opinion of the commission, actually resulted 
from such operations. This fact will be further discussed 
in the argument under Point 2. 
This court must decide whether, under such circum-
stances, the State Tax Commission has authority to collect 
a franchise tax on the net income of the operations of a 
foreign corporation in Utah; and if it has such authority, 
whether the methods employed by the commission in com-
puting the assessment in question were arbitrary or un-
reasonable. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
The questions, which we deem necessary to discuss 
herein, may be classified in the following points. These 
follow closely the order of the questions of law of the plain-
tiff's brief, though for obvious reasons, we have adopted 
our own statements of the problem. 
1. The Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act delegates 
authority to the commission to depart from the statutory 
allocation formula in order to apportion the net income 
fairly and equitably attributable to this state. 
2. The evidence in this case justified the commission's 
actions in departing from the statutory allocation fraction. 
3. The action of the commission was not unreasonable 
nor arbitrary, and, therefore, it did not deprive the plain-
tiff of its property without due process of law. 
4. The plaintiff cannot claim that a departure from 
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the statutory allocation formula is a violation of its rights 
unless it sustains the burden of proving that the method of 
apportionment adopted by the commission is unconstitu-
tional. 
5. The inclusion of financial revenue from intangibles 
in the measure of the corporation franchise tax is statutory 
and constitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
Points 1, 2 and 3 are in the exact order of the ques-
tions of law of the plaintiff's brief. Point 4 has been added 
as an entirely new question involved, while Point 5 is a com-
bined discussion of the last three questions of law discussed 
by the plaintiff. 
POINT I 
THE UTAH CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX ACT 
DELEGATES AUTHORITY TO THE COMMISSION 
TO DEPART FROM THE STATUTORY ALLOCA-
TION FORMULA IN ORDER TO APPORTION THE 
NET INCOME FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY ATTRIB-
UTABLE TO THIS STATE. 
The first main point at issue is raised by plaintiff's 
contention that there is no statutory foundation which will 
justify the commission, in its decision, in departing from 
the statutory manner of determining the sales factor in 
computing the corporation's gross receipts from business 
assignable to Utah, but that, on the contrary, the decision of 
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the commission was entirely arbitrary and unwarranted by 
reason of law. The defendant strongly disagrees with this 
contention and maintains that its decision should be upheld 
by virtue of the correct construction of the statute, the con-
clusions of authoritative students on this involved question, 
the facts of the instant case, and the decisions of the highest 
tribunals of other states and the United States. 
It is elementary that the commission has the authority 
of examining the corporation franchise tax return filed by 
the taxpayer to determine whether the tax reported con-
forms to the requirements of law, as such a delegation of 
power is necessary and fundamental in the administering of 
the act. This specific power is definitely granted by Sec-
tion 80-13-27, Hevised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Without this 
authority, the commission would be so limited in its power 
that it would have to rely completely upon each corporation 
to file a true return and pay a fair tax. 
Subsection 8 of Section 21 of the Utah Franchise Tax 
Act has been interpreted by the plaintiff's counsel as solely 
a limitation on the authority of the tax commission. Because 
we place an entirely different construction on this section, 
we are quoting it in its entirety in order to justify the author-
ity which we maintain is delegated thereunder: 
"If in the judgment of the tax commission the 
application of the foregoing rules does not allocate 
to this state the proportion of net income fairly and 
equitably attributable to this state, it may with such 
information as it may be able to obtain make such 
allocation as is fairly calculated to assign to this 
state the portion of net income reasonably attribut-
able to the business done within this state and to 
avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation." 
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We ask the court to read this section and omit the final 
phrase "and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double 
taxation." Read in this light, it is apparent that the section 
has a meaning in and of itself delegating to the State Tax 
Commission broad powers to arrive at an allocation which 
will assign to this state the correct net income. 
This section of the statute, omitting the phrase "and to 
avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation," was 
modeled after similar provisions of income and franchise 
tax acts in other states, in which the tax had been upheld as 
constitutional. These acts had later been declared uncon-
stitutional because there was no relief for the taxpayer in 
the event that the statutory allocation imposed double tax-
ation. In other words, the delegation to the taxing authori-
ties was one-sided by permitting them to depart from the 
statutory allocation formula to benefit the state, but not per-
mitting a departure when the use of the statutory formula 
was unfair to the taxpayer. With this difficulty in mind, it 
is our opinion that the Utah legislature added this final 
phrase in order to protect the right of the taxpayer, and at 
the same time to retain the authority of the tax commission 
to allocate to the state the portion of net income reasonably 
attributable to the business done within the state. We re-
iterate that this last phrase was appended to the section for 
the sole purpose of protecting the taxpayer, and which sec-
tion, standing alone, would delegate to the tax commission 
the authority the legislature intended the commission to 
have. Economists, accountants and courts have all approved 
the delegation of such power to the tax commission as the 
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only solution of the difficult problem of making a correct 
apportionment. 
Plaintiff's counsel has emphasized that at the time the 
Utah Tax Revision Commission was appointed to study 
the tax structure of this state and to devise a corporation 
tax which would be constitutional, the difficulty was en-
countered of allocating to the various states only that pro-
portion of income which arises from business done in each 
such state. Although this Tax Revision Commission was 
faced with the problem that a strict formula might be de-
clared unconstitutional because it would, in some instances, 
result in double taxation, it was also faced with a greater 
problem of devising a method which would fit any type of 
corporation in this state. This latter difficulty has been 
discussed fully by students of the problem. A very learned 
discussion and the difficulties encountered is to be found 
in the article "State Jurisdiction of Income," by Henry 
Rottschaeffer, 44 Harvard Law Review 1082. A pertinent 
section is quoted herewith : 
"Thus the formulae for allocating a unitary in-
come, like those applied to property taxes under the 
'unit rule' must take due account of factors reflect-
ing the distribution of the system value among its va-
rious parts. The character of the problem is such 
that even economists would disagree as to what fac-
tors most nearly reflect the relative contribution of 
the activities in the various states to the production 
of the total unitary income. There is no doubt that 
better methods could be devised than those that have 
already received judicial sanction * * * A test of 
what is reasonable and what is arbitrary cannot be 
devised apart from economic analysis, but it is cer-
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tain that courts will not insist on any very rigid ad-
herence to the refinements of economic theory as to 
the imputation of income to its economic sources. It 
is still an undecided question whether due process re-
quires direct assignment of income when that is prac-
ticable, but statutes sometime require it. States con-
templabing income taxes might well make provisions 
permitting exceptions to their usual allocation form-
ulae, and provide an alternative phrased in language 
broad enough to admit of great flexibility in applica-
tion, but not so broad as to fail to any standard what-
ever. The existence of income taxes in some states, 
and their ab131ence in others, has led to attempts to 
'siphon' the income from the former into the latter. 
* * * This far courts have refused to permit 
the use of corporate forms for this purpose and have 
determined the income assignable to the state by 
treating the business within the state as an integral 
par·t of the L0;rger business undertaking by the group 
of affiliated corporations. The constitutional power 
of 0; state to enact statutes tha,t permit or require 
such treatment of the income of a group of related 
corporations, has not been determined, but it is 
scarcely conceivable that due process will be so ex-
tended as to forbid the adoption of adequate meas-
ures for preventing the perversions of economic fact 
usually present when these deviSres are employed." 
(Italics Ours.) 
Roswell Magill, Columbia Law School authority on tax-
ation, has arrived at a similar conclusion in his article 
"Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract," found in 
44 Harvard Law Review 953: 
"It seems undesirable in this present forma-
tive state for state legislatures to adopt mandatory 
apportionment formulae applicable to all cases; rath-
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er, a considerable discretion should be vested in the 
taxing authorities not only in the acquisition of in-
formation but also in the apportionment of income. 
As research and experience make more data avail-
able, more definite methods for the allocation of in-
come to the several states can no doubt be worked 
out, just as elimination of double taxation is grad-
ually being accomplished in the field of inheritance 
and estate taxation." 
If we keep in mind these conclusions while reading 
Subsection 8 of Section 21, supra, we are justified in stating 
that the Tax Revision Commission, which proposed the fran-
chise tax act, has adopted a desirable statute. A standard 
formula is provided, yet provision is made for an alterna-
tive basis whereby adequate measures can be taken to pro-
tect the rights of the taxpayers against double taxation, and 
at the same time the state can receive the just and fair 
amount of tax due it. 
With this discussion in mind, we can direct our atten-
tion to the action taken by other states in this respect, and 
the approval accorded by the decisions of their courts. We 
deem the cases cited in plaintiff's brief under its first ques-
tion of law on Pages 15 to 21 to be very material in later 
discussing Point 3 of this brief, but these cases do not hold 
that the legislatures of the respective jurisdictions were de-
prived of delegating to the tax officials the authority to 
depart from a strict formula. The case of Porto Rico Mere. 
vs. Gallardo, 6 F. (2d) 526, cited at page 21 of plaintiff's 
brief, is not in point in deciding whether Subsection 8 is a 
legal justification for the tax commission to depart from 
the statutory formula to ascertain the proportion of income 
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attributable to business in Utah, because Porto Rico had 
no provision for any departure from the normal fraction 
irrespective of the circumstances. 
Evidently, plaintiff's counsel have misread the court's 
decision in the case of Western Telegraph Company vs. 
Query, 144 S. C. 244, 142 S. E. 509, cited at page 22 of their 
brief. As we read the case, the facts and holdings are as 
follows: The State of South Carolina levied an income tax 
of one-third the amount of tax paid to the United States 
on the net income derived from business done in that state. 
The statute made no distinction between intrastate and in-
terstate business. The taxpayer filed a return claiming that 
no income resulted from business done in that state. The 
tax commission assessed a tax by apportioning to the State 
of South Carolina the net income shown on the Federal 
returns which it considered to have resulted from business 
done in the state. This apportionment was done under a 
statute which provided that if the taxpayer failed to make 
such an allocation, then the tax commission was required 
to make the allocation; and the commission was authorized 
to formulate rules and regulations necessary for such allo-
cation of the income. 
The lower court held that the taxes were assessed ac-
cording to the allocation formula devised by the tax com-
mission and were collected in accordance with the law. The 
lower court further held that the case of Commonwealth vs. 
Lorillard, 129 Va. 74, 105 S. E. 683, cited at page 22 of plain-
tiff's brief, was not in point because the statute in Virginia 
did not delegate any discretionary or administrative powers 
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to the Virginia authorities as the South Carolina Act did to 
the tax commission. 
In upholding the lower court's decision, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina confirmed this distinction and held 
the statute constitutional in the following words: 
"It is most earnestly urged, and particularly 
under the case of Commonwealth v. Lorillard, 129 
Va. 74, 105 S. E. 683, that, under a statute claiming 
to be similar to the statute here involved, as there 
is no method of allocation provided by statute, the 
taxing power could not devise a scheme of their own 
by which to determine how much of the total income 
was derived from business done in this state. His 
honor, Judge Townsend, has pointed out in his order 
the difference between the statute in Virginia, upon 
which the Lorillard Case was predicated, and our 
statute, and has rightly reached the conclusion from 
the nature of the act, that the tax commission had 
authority to make the assessment and collect the tax. 
Having found that the tax was rightfully assessed 
and levied, a discussion of the other matter is largely 
academic." 
The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on this identical 
question in permitting the adoption of another allocation 
fraction not provided by the legislature, State Revenue Com-
mission vs. Edward Brothers Company, 194 S. E. 505. 
Georgia had assessed a corporation tax return on a foreign 
corporation which had a mine in the state and sold its 
products in a foreign state. 
The Court upheld the act of the commission allocating 
the income from such sales to Georgia, and differentiated 
the Georgia Act from the Virginia Act, under which the 
12 
case of Commonwealth vs. P. Lorillard Company, supra, was 
decided. The Court, referring to the Commonwealth vs. 
Lorillard case, said : 
"That decision simply held that the statute tax-
ing the entire income of a nonresident, in the absence 
of any contemplation of apportionment, was invalid, 
and that the administrative body could not make the 
tax effective by providing a method of apportion-
ment contrary to the express provisions of the stat-
ute. It is stated in 61 C. ,J. 1582, that 'A statute 
giving an assessing officer or tax commission au-
thority to make such rules and regulations as may 
be deemed necessary in order to carry out the provi-
sions of an income tax statute or the administration 
thereof is to be given a liberal construction to effect-
uate its purpose, and such officer or board is thereby 
authorized to prescribe and enforce any regulation 
designed to carry out the provisions of the tax stat-
ute and not contrary thereto; but no rule or regu-
lation may be validly adopted which does not con-
form to, or conflicts with, the provisions of the stat-
ute imposing the tax.' " 
And further, in a classic statement, justifying the 
adoption of the commission's administrative formula: 
"In Throop on Public Officers, Paragraph 542, 
it is stated: 'The rule respecting such powers is, 
that, in addition to the powers expressly given by 
statute to an officer or a board of officers, he or it 
has, by implication, such additional powers, as are 
necessary for the due and efficient exercise of the 
powers expressly granted, or as may be fairly im-
plied from the statute granting the express powers.' 
So we conclude that the commission, under the pro-
visions of the statute, even if not expressly, did, by 
necessary implication, have the power, upon failure 
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of the taxpayer to do so, to determine the proportion 
provided for in the taxing statute." 
The latest case on this point, Corn vs. Fort, 95 S. W. 
(2d) 620, decided June 13, 1936, is, in our opinion, of great 
importance in that the court had before it all of the cases 
cited by the plaintiff herein. Then, too, the state involved, 
Tennessee, had just amended its act in order to profit by the 
decision and the experience of other states. The legislature 
realized the difficulties which would be encountered both 
by the tax commission in administering the act and by the 
taxpayer in filing returns, if a strict formula were devised 
from which no departure could be made. It, therefore, en-
acted in Section 4 of the act the following provision: 
"The Legislature hereby declares that no adequate 
set formula can be adopted for the determination of 
that proportion of the capital employed in Tennessee 
in case of entities having property both within and 
without this State which said formula would be 
equitable to all entities under all circumstances and 
for that reason has not undertaken to adopt such set 
formula believing that the judicial right of review of 
the Commissioner's allocation mentioned will prove 
more equitable as a whole than any set formula 
which it might adopt, but it expressly declares that 
it is made the duty of the Commissioner to take into 
consideration in making his allocations any and all 
of the above mentioned comparisons andjor ratios 
which will be appropriate in the determination with 
respect to the entity under consideration of the 
amount of capital employed by it in this State, and 
all other relevant facts." 
The formula provided by the legislature for the guid-
ance of the Commissioner in apportioning the proper net 
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income is practically identical with the formula used by the 
State Tax Commission in the instant case. We are, there-
fore, setting it forth in its entirety: 
"That in the case of entities having property 
located both in this State and elsewhere the Com-
missioner is hereby authorized and empowered to 
adopt such method as he may deem adequate and 
equitable both to the State and to the taxpayer in 
determining the amount of capital as hereinabove 
defined properly allocable to this State and employed 
by the entity in this State. In determining the 
amount of such capital employed by the entity in 
question in this State, the Commissioner shall take 
into consideration the extent of the tangible prop-
erty of such entity in this State as compared to the 
extent of the entire property of the entity wherever 
located; the gross receipts of the entire entity; the 
value of goods, wares and merchandise manufactured 
or maintained here as compared to the gross value 
of goods manufactured or maintained by such en-
tity everywhere." 
The court in this case of Corn vs. Fort held that such 
a broad delegation of power was constitutional: 
"We can see no illegal delegation of authority to 
the commissioner. Certain definite formula is set 
out in the act for his guidance. He can look to other 
things in ascertaining the value of the property, as a 
particular case might demand. Had this right been 
withheld from him, injustice could arise. The anno-
tator who prepared the note to Hans Rees' Sons 
v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 
L. Ed. 879, says, in part: 
'In the second place, it seems undesirable, 
in this present formative stage, for state legis-
latures to adopt mandatory apportionment 
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formula applicable to all cases; rather, a con-
siderable discretion should be vested in the tax-
ing authorities, not only in the acquisition of 
information, but also in the apportionment of 
income.'" 
Thus, we see that a legislature has put into practice the 
conclusions of Professor Magill, supra, and subsequently the 
highest court of that state has upheld such delegation. 
Counsel for the defendant have cited at great length 
at pages 20 and 21 of their brief the opinion of Mr. Justice 
Cardoza in the case of People ex rei Studebaker Corporation 
of America vs. Gilchrist et al., State Tax Commission, 155 
N. E. 68, 244 N. Y. 144. This was not a case, however, of 
departing from a normal allocation formula, but a case in 
which the State Tax Commission saw fit to demand a con-
solidated return and thereby to look beyond the corporate 
entity within the state's jurisdiction. The facts and the de-
cision are entirely foreign to the question before this court, 
and any dictum rendered by this learned judge in regard to 
the right of a state to demand a consolidated return in order 
to tax the profits of a corporation not qualified to do busi-
ness under the laws of the state, should not be given any 
consideration in determining the issue before us. 
On the other hand, we deem it more important to direct 
this court's attention to the case of United States Advertis-
ing Corporation vs. Lynch, 1 Fed. Supp., 302, decided in the 
District Court of the Southern District of New York. An 
assessment made by the tax commission of New York, after 
a hearing, was contested. In commenting on the statute 
providing for an alternative allocation fraction, which is 
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analogous to Utah's provision and set out in the following 
quotation from the decision, the court stated : 
"The usual method provided by the statute for 
allocating income to sources within and without the 
state is under the rule or formula which somewhat 
arbitrarily segregates the assets of the corporation. 
Section 211, par. 4, reads as follows: 'If it shall ap-
pear to the tax commission that the segregation of 
assets shown by the report does not properly reflect 
the corporate activity or business done, or the income 
earned from corporate activity or from business 
done in this state because of the character of the cor-
poration's business and the character and location 
of its assets, the tax commission is authorized and 
empowered to equitably adjust the tax upon the basis 
of the corporate activity or the business done within 
and without the state rather than upon capital or 
assets employed.' 
"Such a method is regarded as valid. Bass, 
Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 
266 U.S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, 69 L. Ed. 282; Underwood 
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 
S. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165; S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett 
(D. C.) 51 F. (2d) 353, except in such instances 
where the method results in unreasonably including 
in the tax base income earned without the state. 
Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rei. Maxwell, 
283 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879. To avoid 
such a situation the alternative method for equitable 
assessment upon the basis of the corporate activity 
or business done within and without the state has 
been provided, with the object of preventing arbi-
trary, discriminatory, and unequal assessments 
which might arise under certain conditions if the 
segregation of assets rule or formula was used. It 
applies to every corporation, foreign or domestic, 
where the segregation of assets does not properly 
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reflect the business or activity of the corporation. 
It allocates the corporate income to the states where 
the business producing that income was carried on 
and in proportion to the business transacted in each 
state. The statute is definite in stating that the 
occasions are those when it shall appear 'That the 
segregation of assets shown by the report does not 
properly reflect the corporate activity or business 
done, or the income earned from corporate activity 
or from business done in this state because of the 
character of the corporation's business * * * 
and location of its assets,' and the basis of the allo-
cation is the corporate activity or business done 
within or without the state. The position of the de-
fendant is certainly strengthened by the enactment 
of the present provision, and it seems to me that in 
view of the decision in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Travis 
(D. C.) 274 F. 975, affirmed 266 U. S. 265, 45 S. 
Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed. 279, it is no longer open to question. 
It also seems to be settled that this court will not 
in an equity proceeding enjoin the collection of the 
state tax even though the taxpayer be without an 
adequate remedy at law if the assessment of the tax 
is due to an error on the part of the assessing of-
ficers and not due to an unconstitutional statute. 
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Travis, supra." 
It is important to note that the federal court has dif-
ferentiated between the right to employ the method and an 
unreasonable use of such method. We shall discuss this dif-
ferentiation under Point 3. This federal case is squarely in 
point and should conclusively prove that the statute dele-
gates to the tax commission authority to depart from the 
normal allocation fraction in order to fairly and equitably 
apportion the proper net income to this state. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE JUSTIFIED THE COM-
MISSION'S ACTIONS IN DEPARTING FROM THE 
STATUTORY ALLOCATION FACTOR. 
The next question is how much evidence and facts must 
the commission have before it to justify the use of some 
other formula to arrive at the correct proportion of net in-
come to be allocated to this state. It is elementary that each 
type of business derives its income from different opera-
tions. One formula which would be fair to a taxpayer en-
gaged in the mercantile business might not be fair to a 
corporation engaged in the mining business. Similarly, a 
formula which will be fair to the corporation engaged in the 
mining business may not allocate to the State of Utah the 
net income from the operations of a corporation engaged in 
the building and loan business. There is the further diffi-
culty that the formula, as applied to one corporation, will be 
fair to both the taxpayer and state; but as applied to an-
other corporation carrying on the same type of business 
with a different accounting system, or a different method 
of distribution and sale, the formula would be either unfair 
to the corporation or would not allocate to the state a just 
proportion of the net income. These facts have been pointed 
out by the authorities and by the courts, quoted heretofore, 
as the basic reason for giving tax authorities the discretion 
of applying different formulas. 
It is the duty of the tax commission to investigate and 
determine these corporations' activities so that the correct 
formula can be applied to arrive at the correct net income. 
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In the course of such research, the state tax commission has 
frequently found it advisable to eliminate one or more of the 
statutory factors in determining the net income of mining 
companies and of building and loan companies. It has also 
been found that where local manufacturing companies have 
shipped their products out of the state for sale, to allocate 
such sales and the net income therefrom out of the state 
does not allocate to Utah a just proportion of the net income 
attributable to this state. Therefore, a more proper alloca-
tion should be calculated. 
What are the facts in this particular case which were 
before the commission when it deemed a departure from 
the statutory allocation fraction necessary? In 1933 the 
operations within Utah, as evidenced by the consolidated 
return for that year of the California Packing Corporation 
and the Utah Packing Corporation, showed gross receipts 
from business in Utah of $118,176.33. In 1934, by this same 
evidence, gross receipts allocated to Utah were $143,689.99. 
But in the year 1935, despite the same operations of the same 
property, there were reported to the tax commission no 
gross receipts from business in Utah, due to the change in 
accounting methods and corporate organization. Such in-
formation conclusively proved to the commission that if 
there ever were an instance in which its judgment should 
be exercised to find that the formula used by the taxpayer 
did not allocate the proportion of net income fairly and 
equitably attributable to this state, this was the time. 
The tax commission was then faced with the problem 
of calculating an allocation formula which would assign to 
this state the portion of net income reasonably attributable 
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to the business done within this state. The statutory for-
mula, set out in plaintiff's brief at pages 3 to 5, is based 
upon (1) tangible property in Utah, (2) salaries and wages 
payable in Utah, and (3) gross receipts from business done 
in Utah. In adopting a proper formula to measure this 
company's tax, the first two factors were left unchanged, 
as they were not affected by the taxpayer's reorganization 
of accounting methods and corporate structure. The crux 
of the problem was to determine what were the gross re-
ceipts from ~usiness assignable to this state. During 1933 
and 1934, when the operations of the company were carried 
on by subsidiary corporations, the gross receipts could be 
determined from the taxpayer's return, because the com-
pany reported the value of the products manufactured and 
subsequently distributed by the parent corporation. In the 
year in question, the value of these products could only be 
determined, according to the company's records, on the basis 
of the amount received by it from the sale of such products. 
We submit that it was unreasonable for a company 
which operated property in this state, valued at $1,121,-
746.55, to have no gross receipts from this property in Utah. 
The only possible means of determining the gross receipts: 
in this state were from the sales of the products produced.j 
in the state. As the record will show, the tax commission 
endeavored to ascertain the total sales price of the merchan-
dise packed and shipped from the corporation's Utah plants. 
This figure was necessary in order to allocate the income 
from the sale of the merchandise to the state in which it 
originated, which is Utah. 
There are three bases to be used in determining the 
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proper allocation of sales. They are: (1) the origin of the 
~ ... 
goods, (2) the location of the sales office, and (3) the 
-destination of the products. In its judgment, because of 
the particular facts, the second, or location of sales office 
theory, has always been deemed by the commission to be 
inapplicable, because any taxpayer could easily transfer its 
sales office outside Utah and thus defeat any allocation of 
sales. The third, or destination theory, has been minimized 
by the commission in practice as not being as equitable or 
economically sound as the origin theory. Consequently, the 
first or origin theory has been adopted by the commission 
in other instances and was used in this instance. From an 
economic standpoint, such a conclusion is justified whether 
the sales are made in this state or in another state. The sales 
price is only indicia of the receipts from the manufacturing 
operations. Although greater profits may be derived from 
the sale and distribution of the products, it cannot be denied 
that the operation of a corporation of more than a million 
dollars' worth of property produces receipts which should 
be taken into account in determining an allocation fraction 
to apportion to this state a fair and equitable portion of the 
net income of the corporation's entire activities. 
One state has specifically legislated into its allocation 
formula this origin theory. Wisconsin in 1929 amended its 
act so that one of the factors used in the allocation formula 
was the ratio of the total cost of manufacturing within that 
state to the total cost of the manufacturing everywhere. 
Included in the total cost was to be the cost of all goods, 
materials and supplies used in manufacturing, the total 
wages and salaries paid in manufacturing and the total 
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overhead. The third factor was the sales factor. Commerce 
Clearing House has issued an annotation discussing whether 
the enactment by the legislature of such a definite rule gov-
erning apportionment, supersedes the United States Su-
preme Court ruling in the United States Glue case (to be 
discussed later) that the profit on a sale of goods manufac-
tured in Wisconsin is taxable in Wisconsin, regardless of 
from what point the sales of products or deliveries are made. 
In summarizing the practice of the Wisconsin Tax Com-
mission the Commentator stated: 
"Generally, the cases in which an apportion-
ment are allowed have been largely increased in num-
ber, but a decided tendency toward continuing the 
effect of the Glue Case Rule even when an appor-
tionment is permitted has been evidenced. Where 
either a fo'reign or domestic manufa,cturing corpora-
tion operating within and without the state operates 
a factory within W,isconsin, the general practice now 
is to require that the selling value of the product 
nw.nufactured in Wisconsin be credited to that state 
in the 'sale mtio' of the appor·tionment computa,tion 
although the product mamtfactured in the state is 
actually sold from a regularly established and main-
tained, bona fide sa,les offic·e outside Wisconsin. 
In other wm·ds, instead of criediting Wisconsin in the 
apportionment ratios with only those elements ac-
tually appearing in the state according to the stat-
utory 'rule, namely, tangible properties and manu-
factu.ring costs, a sales element hM been injected rep-
resented by the selling value of the product manu-
factured in Wisconsin." (Italics Ours.) 
Therefore, we maintain that there was sufficient evi-
dence before the defendant to justify a departure from the 
statutory allocation fraction as applied to this company 
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and that the fraction ultimately adopted was economically 
sound and justly and equitably attributed to this state the 
proportion of net income reasonably assigned to business 
done within Utah. 
POINT III 
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WAS NOT UN-
REASONABLE NOR ARBITRARY, AND, THERE-
FORE, IT DID NOT DEPRIVE THE PLAINTIFF OF 
ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
The adoption of the sales factor in allocating the net in-
come of the business done in this state is not an unreason-
able or arbitrary measure of the gross receipts. A formula 
based on this factor does not deprive a foreign corporation 
of property without due process of law, according to the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In 
fact, the trend of decisions indicates that the highest tribu-
nal will not interfere with the state's assessment based on 
such a method unless the formula has been unreasonably 
applied. To prove conclusively that such is the trend, we 
shall in some detail outline the development of the law on 
this highly controversial constitutional issue. 
The basic case on this subject is United States Glue Co. 
v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 S. Ct. 499. The court 
there held that a state, in levying a general income tax upon 
the gains and profits of a corporation, may include in the 
computation of tax the net income derived from the sale 
of goods manufactured in the state, shipped outside of the 
state and sold to residents of foreign states through branch 
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offices located outside of the state, without contravening 
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 
Cases cited to confirm the right of a state to levy an 
income tax on the net income derived from local property 
and business which is owned and operated by a resident of 
another state are the companion cases of Shaffer v. Carter, 
(1920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, and Travis v. Yale and 
Towne Manufacturing Company, (1920) 252 U. S. 60, 40 
S. Ct. 228. The principles which are the foundation of all 
excise and franchise taxes of the state are elucidated as 
follows in the Shaffer case : 
"In our system of government the States have 
general dominion, and, saving as restricted by par-
ticular provisions of the Federal Constitution, com-
plete dominion over all persons, property, and busi-
ness transactions within their borders; they assume 
and perform the duty of preserving and protecting 
all such persons, property, and business, and, in 
consequence, have the power normally pertaining to 
governments to resort to all reasonable forms of 
taxation in order to defray the governmental ex-
penses. Certainly they are not restricted to property 
taxation, nor to any particular form of excises. In 
well-ordered society, property has value chiefly for 
what it is capable of producing, and the activities of 
mankind are devoted largely to making recurrent 
gains from the use and development of property, 
from tillage, mining, manufacture, from the employ-
ment of human skill and labor, or from a combina-
tion of some of these; gains capable of being de-
voted to their own support and the surplus accumu-
lated as an increase of capital. That the State, from 
whose laws, property and business and industry de-
rive the protection and security without which pro-
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duction and gainful occupation would be impossible, 
is debarred from exacting a share of those gains in 
the form of income taxes for the support of the gov-
ernment, is a proposition so wholly inconsistent with 
fundamental principles as to be refuted by its mere 
statement. That it may tax the land but not the crop, 
the tree but not the fruit, the mine or well but not 
the product, the business but not the profit derived 
from it, is wholly inadmissible. 
"Income taxes are a recognized method of dis-
tributing the burdens of government, favored be-
cause requiring contributions from those who realize 
current pecuniary benefits under the protection of 
the government and because the tax may be readily 
proportioned to their ability to pay. 
"And we deem it clear, upon principle as well as 
authority, that just as a State may impose general 
income taxes upon its own citizens and residents 
whose persons are subject to its control, it may, as 
a necessary consequence, levy a duty of like char-
acter, and not more onerous in its effect, upon in-
comes accruing to non-residents from their property 
or business within the State, or their occupations 
carried on therein; enforcing payment, so far as it 
can, by the exercise of a just control over persons 
and property within its borders." 
The question of allocation of net income was first 
raised, and, it was apparently thought decided, in the case 
of Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254 
U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 45. Because the United States Supreme 
Court in its later decisions has implied that its holding in 
this case should have been the authoritative guide on this 
question, we shall set forth in detail the facts and the law: 
The foreign corporation maintained a factory in Connec-
ticut; the products of this factory were sold and rented 
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through its main office in New York City. The tax was 
computed on the net profits apportioned according to the 
property in the state as compared to all property. The court 
held the tax was not in contravention of the commerce 
clause, and, of more significance, that it was not imposed 
on income from business conducted beyond the state's bor-
ders. The fact that most of the profit (80''/'o) was received 
in other states was not sufficient proof that the formula 
was unreasonable. "The profits of the corporation were 
largely earned by a series of transactions beginning with 
manufacture in Connecticut and ending with the sale in 
other states." The method, not being inherently arbitrary, 
was upheld. 
Then in the case of Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton v. State 
Tax Commission (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, cited 
at page 19 of plaintiff's brief, the court upheld an allocation 
formula used in the franchise tax act of New York. It held 
that a foreign corporation cannot defeat a franchise tax 
assessed against it for the privilege of doing business in a 
state where a portion of its sales are made, if the tax is 
based upon the proportion of its net income which its assets 
within the state bear to its total assets, though the corpora-
tion's records assigned no net income to that state. The 
objections, that the company was being deprived of its 
property without due process of law, or that the tax was 
an unconstitutional burden on foreign commerce, were over-
ruled. The court held that New York was acting within its 
rights in devising some formula to tax the income of a 
unitary business. 
On a first reading of the case of Hans Rees' Sons v. 
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North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, cited at pages 
17 and 23 of plaintiff's brief, the court apparently reverses 
its former position. But the court differentiated the facts 
therein and the Underwood Typewriter Company case in 
holding that the rule of the latter could not be extended so 
as to tax all the net income in one state. 
"These decisions are not authority for the con-
clusion that where a corporation manufactures in 
one state and sells in another, the net profits of 
the entire transaction, as a unitary enterprise, may 
be attributed, regardless of evidence to either state." 
Thus the Supreme Court did not reverse its former posi-
tion, as will be further brought out in this discussion. The 
court held that North Carolina had gone beyond the limi-
tations prescribed in taxing the profits "which in no just 
sense (are) attributable to transactions within its juris-
dictions," but the court did not hold that a proper formula 
for allocation purposes could not be used. 
To summarize the effect of this decision, we next turn 
our attention to the case of Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Manu-
facturing Co. (1933) 204 N. C. 365, 368 S. E. 397. Because 
the subsequent comment by the United States Supreme 
Court on this decision is the latest authoritative ruling, and 
the facts and law are similar to the instant case, we ask the 
court's indulgence in reviewing this decision. 
The statute provided for a tax against the corporation 
on "such proportion of its entire net income as the fair 
values of real estate and tangible property in this state is to 
the fair cash values of its entire real estate and tangible 
property owned by it." The corporation was a Delaware 
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corporation which carried on a manufacturing business in 
North Carolina. It allocated 58.538 per cent of its net in-
come to the state by using such proportion as the value of 
its tangible property in North Carolina bore to the value of 
all of its property, tangible and intangible, within and with-
out the state. 
The state in arriving at its deficiency followed the stat-
utory allocation fraction and excluded the value of intangi-
bles as a factor. The intangibles consisted of cash, accounts 
receivable, notes receivable, stock in other corporations and 
prepaid expenses. Only one-third of the cash was deposited 
in North Carolina. 
The state's petition contained the following statement: 
"As a statement of fact, rather than a conten-
tion for the allocation of petitioner's taxes, the sales 
for the period of the report made without the state 
were the sum of $1,545,485.94, or 99.8 per centum of 
the total sales; and within the state, the sum of 
$3,021.13, or 00.2 per centum of the total sales." 
It was conceded that the business was unitary. As to 
allocating the income of the unitary business, the court 
stated: 
"Conceding that a unitary business may pro-
duce an income which must be allocated to two or 
more states in which its activities are carried on, 
such a business may not be split up arbitrarily and 
conventionally in applying the tax laws. It would 
seem to be necessary that there should be some log-
ical reference to the production of income; the dis-
tinction should be founded on a corresponding dif-
ference in apportionment of productive capital, in-
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vestment, or employment, within the unitary busi-
ness. 
"The mere statement of a witness as to the in-
come separately derived from purcha.se, from manu-
facture, and from sale, without supporting data, 
showing the influ.ence of each factor in producing 
profit, gain, or income from thie separate operations-
such as should be allocated to it independently-is 
merely an arbitrary guess. The bare fact of sale 
produces no income. It is merely the act by which 
the income is oaptured; the capital, the organization, 
or effoTts which produce the sale are the things to 
be considend in asceTtaining the amount of income 
to be cTedited to the sale. Certa.inly, in a. unitarry 
business, we must look further back than to the sale 
itself or the activities which actua.lly pToduce it. The 
tangible propeTty element of capital outlay is cared 
for in the ta.ngible pToperty m.tio set up by the 
srotute. If there is anything beyond that of suffi-
cient magnitude to effect the constitutionality' of 
the application of this nile, it must be shown in the 
e1xidence; the lnaden resting upon the taxpayer to do 
so." (Italics Ours.) 
This opinion is the crux of the entire issue, and it is on 
this reasoning that the sole question involved, namely, "was 
the basis of taxation adopted by the commissioner of reve-
nue arbitrary and unreasonable and in conflict with the 
Interstate Commerce Clause and the F'ourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution," was answered in 
the negative. 
In upholding the tax, the court makes the following 
points: 
(1) "A state may not impose any tax which 
results in laying a direct burden upon interstate 
commerce. But a state may, in levying a general 
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income tax, include within the taxable status so 
much of net income derived from interstate com-
merce as is properly apportionable to operations 
and business within the state. U. S. Glue Company 
vs. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 
1135, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 748 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 
U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445; Travis v. Yale 
& Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 40 S. Ct. 228, 64 
L. Ed. 460. 
(2) "A tax upon the net income of such cor-
porations is not a burden on interstate commerce, 
simply because the products of the business are 
shipped and sold out of the state. 
(3) "A state may tax the net income of a for-
eign corporation doing business within its taxing 
jurisdiction, and may include therein a portion of 
such net income arising from interstate commerce, 
properly apportionable to the state. Underwood 
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 
S. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton vs. 
State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, 
69 L. Ed. 282; Maxwell v. Hans Rees' Sons, 199 N.C. 
42, 153 S. E. 850; Id., 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 
75 L. Ed. 879. 
( 4) "A state may set up a formula for deter-
mining that portion of net income properly attribut-
able to business within the state, including that from 
interstate operations. * * * In Underwood Type-
writer Co. v. Chamberlain, supra, it sustained the 
Connecticut statute identical with that of North 
Carolina, which used the value of real estate and 
tangible personal property within the state as the 
numerator and the value of real estate and tangible 
personal property, both within and without the state, 
as the denominator of the formulatory fraction." 
The final point determined in the Maxwell case was 
the question to be considered next as to whether the state 
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or the plaintiff has the burden of proving the unconstitu-
tionality both of the statute and of its application. 
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld this 
decision of the Maxwell case in 291 U. S. 642 by denying a 
Writ of Certiorari in the following words: 
"This case is controlled by the decision in Un-
derwood Typewriter Company vs. Chamberlain, 
rather than by the decision in the Hans Rees' Sons 
case." 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT CLAIM THAT A DEPART-
URE FROM THE STATUTORY ALLOCATION 
FORMULA IS A VIOLATION OF ITS RIGHTS UN-
LESS IT SUSTAINS THE BURDEN OF PROVING 
THAT THE METHOD OF APPORTIONMENT 
ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION IS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL. 
It is the contention of the defendant that at the official 
hearing given the company with regard to the deficiency 
assessment, and only at such hearing, could evidence have 
been introduced to prove that the application of the formula 
adopted by the commission was unreasonable and deprived 
the company of its property without due process of law. 
Section 80-13-47, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, which sets 
forth the rules for review by this Supreme Court of the tax 
commission's decision states: 
"Upon the hearing no new or additional evi-
dence may be introduced, but the cause shall be heard 
on the record before the tax commission as certi-
fied to by it." 
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The Legislature has delegated the quasi-judicial func-
tion to the tax commission as a trained body of determining 
whether the allocation fraction works a fair and equitable 
result. 
A study of the hearing will reveal that, although the 
company's representatives objected to the formula adopted 
to measure the gross receipts, they were unable to furnish 
figures to show how such a formula attributed a greater pro-
portion of the net income to Utah than was justly attribut-
able to the operations within the state. 
Two important facts can be gleaned from the hearing 
which is made a part of the record herein: ( 1) That the ac-
counting records of the corporation could not show that the 
net income during the year in question from the operations 
in this state was less than the two years previous; (2) 
That the objection submitted by the plaintiff to set up a 
separate accounting basis to allocate the receipts from the 
Utah operations in conformity with the "origin theory" 
was that such accounting would be "messy and complicated." 
Other than this, no affirmative evidence and conclusive 
proof was furnished by the taxpayer to the tax commission 
to show that the formula as applied to the plaintiff worked 
an unconstitutional burden on it. 
If the company's representatives had furnished evi-
dence of the gross receipts of its operations in Utah, and the 
commission had not substituted this evidence for the form-
ula used, the plaintiff could truthfully claim that it had not 
had due process. One rule of law stands out in all opinions 
of the United States Supreme Court in cases involving the 
allocation factor-that the burden is on the taxpayer at the 
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hearing before the administrative body to prove the method 
adopted by that body is discriminatory, and that the appli-
cation of the formula is inherently arbitrary if it allocates 
an unreasonably proportion of the net income to the state. 
If the taxpayer has been unable to introduce evidence, the 
statute and its application will be held as constitutional. 
The burden rests upon the one who attacks the consti-
tutionality of a statute in its applicability to him to over-
come the presumption of facts supporting constitutionality, 
which attaches to all legislative acts. Roberts and Schaefer 
vs. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50, 46 S. Ct. 375; Goreib v. Fox, 
274 U. S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675; Lawrence vs. Mississippi State 
Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556. 
In passing on the constitutionality of an Illinois Fran-
chise Tax Act in Pump Hairpin Manufacturing Company vs. 
Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 42 S. Ct. 305 the Supreme Court 
recognized that the question was a practical one depending 
upon the facts. The court stated: 
"No formula has yet been devised by which it 
can be determined in all cases whether or not such 
a tax is valid; and applying the repeated declara-
tions of this court, in the cases cited and in many 
others, the question is inherently a practical one, 
depending for its decision on the special facts of each 
case." 
In the case of Underwood Typewriter Company vs. 
Chamberlain, supra, the court first recognized that the tax-
payer must bear this burden of proving "special facts" 
and held that the corporation did not introduce evidence to 
show that the net income attributed to the state was un-
reasonable. We direct the court's attention to the plaintiff's 
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brief, Pages 16 and 17, where this is admitted. Again in the 
case of Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton vs. State Tax Commis-
sion, supra, the company was unable to prove that the ap-
plication of the allocation formula produced an unreason-
able result. Therefore, the court held the formula adopted 
by New York to be valid. In the case of Maxwell v. Kent-Cof-
fey Mfg. Co., supra, the court h~d more facts before it than 
in the two previous cases cited. In fact, it is apparent that 
the corporation had furnished the information which the 
State Tax Commission of Utah had requested of the plain-
tiff, but that such information was disregarded by the state 
authorities. The court, in holding that North Carolina had 
taken a disproportionate share of the profits of the cor-
poration, declared that the allocation was thereby un-
reasonable. 
"Undoubtedly, the enterprise of a corporation 
which manufactures and sells its manufactured pro-
duct is ordinarily a unitary business, and all the 
factors in that enterprise are essential to the real-
ization of profits. The difficulty of making an exact 
apport'ionment is apparent and lvence, when the State 
has adopted a method not intrinsically arbitrary, 
it will be sustained until proof is offered of an un-
reasonable and arrbitrary application in particular 
cases." (Italics ours.) 
In our discussion of Maxwell vs. Kent-Coffey Company, 
supra, at page 27 of this brief, we stated that the court, 
as the fifth point of its decision, distinguished the basis of 
holdings in the Hans Rees' Case from the Underwood Type-
writer and the Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton cases. The court, 
in this connection, said : 
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"The appellee relies upon Maxwell v. Hans Rees' 
Sons, supra, as supporting its contentions. The dif-
ference is that in the Hans Rees' Case, evidence was 
presented breaking up the business into the separate 
elements of buying, manufacturing, and selling. No 
effort of that kind was made in the instant case." 
The court then stated that it was following the Under-
wood Typewriter case and that although there 99% of 
the net profits arose from sales in other states, and only 
47%% of the net income was apportioned to Connecticut, 
whereas in the instant case, 98.4% of the products were sold 
out of the state and 19.2% of the income was assigned to 
North Carolina, the cases were identical. As in the Under-
wood Typewriter case, the corporation merely asserted as 
a defense that the tax was arbitrary and unreasonable and, 
therefore, unconstitutional as taking its property without 
due process of law or as being a burden upon interstate 
commerce. In the Hans Rees' Case, however, distinguished 
therefrom, the facts were presented to show how much of 
the income could be chargeable to buying, how much to 
manufacturing and how much to selling. By the introduc-
tion of the records it was proved that only 17% of the net 
income arose from manufacturing, whereas 83% of its net 
income was taxed. 
Summarizing, the court in the Maxwell case concluded: 
"Always, then, the burden rests upon the tax-
payer to show that the allocation formula, set up 
in the statute, produces such an arbitrary and un-
reasonable result as to be unconstitutional, as ap-
plied to the facts of the particular case. In the Bass, 
Ratcliff & Gretton Case, supra, it was said by the 
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court, page 283 of 266 U. S., 45 S. Ct. 82, 84: 'It is 
not shown in the present case, any more than in the 
Underwood Case, that this application ofthe statutory 
method of apportionment has produced an unreason-
able result.' " 
The deduction we have made above from these cases 
is substantiated in the bulletin of the National Tax Asso-
ciation for May, 1931. The editor concludes that if a corpo-
ration can show that its business is divisible and that the 
allocation fraction does not approximately reflect the true 
division, the fraction cannot be used. He further states 
that there are approximately two tests which the allocation 
statute must meet: (1) It must be fair on its face; and (2) 
must not operate unreasonably and arbitrarily in a par-
ticular case. 
The annotator to the Hans Rees' case in 75 L. Ed., 
page 79, has arrived at a corolla ted conclusion: 
"Allocation formulas, fair on their face, will 
apparently be upheld, unless the taxpayer sustains 
the burden of affirmatively proving that they oper-
ate unreasonably and arbitrarily in his particular 
case." 
After an exhaustive search through the records and the 
plaintiff's brief, we are certain that this court will be un-
able to find that the plaintiff either at the hearing or to 
date has furnished one iota of evidence or information to 
sustain the burden that the tax commission has allocated 
an unreasonable proportion of its net income to the State 
of Utah, and as a consequence can arrive at the same con-
clusion as the court did in the case of S. S. Kresge v. Bennett, 
51 F. (2d) 353, where it held: 
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"Since the Plaintiff cannot show by the facts be-
fore us what its net income from New York State is, 
but can merely estimate it, we do not think that there 
is anything before us to sustain the contention that 
the method of apportionment adopted by the Com-
mission was unconstitutional. If the actual net in-
come from the state cannot be demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty, the commission can properly 
be intrusted with some discretion in determining 
what method to use in approximating it. It may 
possibly be that the Plaintiff's figures are a some-
what closer approximation than the commission's, 
but that would not warrant our holding the tax il-
legal if the commission's method was a reasonable 
one. (Citing the Underwood Typewriter Co., the 
Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton, and the Hans Rees' 
cases)" 
POINT V 
THE INCLUSION OF FINANCIAL REVENUE FROM 
INTANGIBLES IN THE MEASURE OF THE COR-
PORATION FRANCHISE TAX IS STATUTORY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In keeping with the tax commission's attempt to reach 
all the net income derived from business done in this state, 
the allocation fraction was applied to the total net income of 
the company. This net income included the income from in-
tangibles. The plaintiff contends that the value of these in-
tangibles should not be included in the allocation formula, 
nor should the income therefrom be taxed, because such a 
tax would result in double taxation. 
The tax commission has taken the most logical stand in 
regard to the taxation of this net income, in the same pro-
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portion as all other net income. Robert C. Brown, in his 
article "Multiple Taxation by the States," has summarized 
the doctrine that these intangibles have a situs wherever 
the business of the corporation is conducted, at 48 Harvard 
Law Review 420 in the following words: 
"The most important exception to the rule that 
intangible property is taxable at the domicile of the 
owner is in the case of an indebtedness constituting 
a part of the assets used in a continuous business; 
It may then be taxed as property where the business 
is carried on, even though the owner of the business 
is a resident of another jurisdiction. This is the 
doctrine generally referred to as 'the business situs 
of credits,' and it is, or at least has been, almost uni-
versally accepted." 
The intangibles in question have been accumulated as a 
result of all the company's operations in all the states in 
which it does business. It may be presumed, therefore, that 
the intangible assets were realized in the identical propor-
tion that the business done in Utah bears to the total busi-
ness of the corporation. The assets originally having been 
derived from the business wherever conducted, the income 
from such assets, as it accrues, should be attributed to 
wherever the business is carried on. Merely because the cor-
poration holds the intangibles in one state where it might 
do no business whatever except to receive dividends, or be-
cause its main business office is in another state, is no valid 
reason why the situs of the property should be artificially 
considered to be located in one of those states. Receiving 
income from intangibles does not amount to doing business 
in any one state or at any one particular place. Rather, 
it is but incidental to the main business of the company, and 
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having been derived from the principal activities of the com-
pany, the income from intangibles should be taxed in that 
proportion which the operations in each state bear to the 
total operations in all states. In such way, and only in such 
way, may Utah, as well as the other states, fairly and equit-
ably apportion the tax on such income. Granting that the 
state tax commission has been delegated the power to achieve 
such a result, it is claimed that no constitutional provision 
is violated thereby. 
The commission has not attempted to allocate the in-
tangible assets as property having a taxable situs in Utah. 
We maintain, however, that there is no equitable reason 
why the net income from these intangibles should not be in-
cluded as part of the net income subject to the apportion-
ment formula. To admit that the net income of all the 
corporation's operations is subject to a proper allocation 
fraction, but to dispute the inclusion of the net income from 
the intangibles, is an artificial and false classification on 
the part of the company. 
The case of Wheeling Steel Corporation vs. Fox, 298 
U. S. 193, 80 L. Ed. 1143, cited at pages 33 and 34 in plain-
tiff's brief, has been emphasized by the plaintiff as a case 
in point. We submit that there the court was construing 
an ad valorem or property tax, which is a direct tax, and not 
as herein an excise or indirect tax on the income from in-
tangibles. There is a decided difference in the two. In 
the general use of the allocation fraction we do not base 
the tax upon the ground that the situs of property is in Utah, 
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but we merely allocate that proportion of net income rea-
sonably attributed to business done in Utah. 
That property only has a situs at the domicile of the 
owner is refuted by the United States Supreme Court in 
Wheeling Steel Corporation case in the following statement: 
"When we deal with intangible property, such 
as credits and choses in action generally, we encoun-
ter the difficulty that by reason of the absence of 
physical characteristics they have no situs in the 
physical sense, but have the situs attributable to 
them in legal conception." 
The same defenses that have been raised by the plain-
tiff were argued before the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the recent case of Matson Navigation Company 
vs. State Board of Equalization, 297 U. S. 441, 56 S. 
Ct. 553. The State Tax Commission of Utah in this re-
spect has been guided by the procedure of the California 
Board of Equalization in administering the corporation 
franchise tax of Utah because Utah's act more closely paral-
lels California's act than that of any other state, including 
Massachusetts, after whose act both of the western states' 
acts were modeled. The Supreme Court of the United States 
in the Matson Navigation Company case upheld the action 
of California in applying the allocation formula to all the 
net income of the corporation. The court held that if the 
state has jurisdiction to exact a tax for the privilege of doing 
business in the state, it is immaterial how the income which 
is used to measure the tax arises: 
"Net income from appellant's intrastate, inter-
state, and foreign business attributable to California, 
may be taken into account in computing the tax. As 
41 
the taxing jurisdiction of California extends to that 
income, the use thereof to compute the tax may not 
be said to be arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 
Plaintiff has qualified to do business in this state. 
When Utah granted it the privilege of exercising a corporate 
franchise in Utah, the company must, of necessity, bear its 
burden of taxes in order to retain this privilege. If an 
individual operated the same business in this state and re-
ceived income from intangibles, he would be forced to pay 
an individual income tax on the income of such intangibles 
under our law. Since the state affords the plaintiff the same 
privileges and benefits that it affords an individual, the 
plaintiff should pay a tax on its net income in the proportion 
in which the net income is attributable to the operations in 
this state. In the dictum to the recent case of Colgate vs. 
Harvey, 296 U. S. at page 422, 56 S. Ct. 252, the Supreme 
Court of the United States acknowledged the difficulty of 
determining the constitutionality of taxing statutes. It 
stated: 
"This court has frequently said that absolute 
equality in taxation cannot be obtained, and is not 
required under the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * 
The boundary between what is permissable and what 
is forbidden by the constitutional requirement has 
never been precisely fixed, and is incapable of exact 
delimitation. In the great variety of cases which 
have arisen, decisions may seem to be difficult of 
reconcilement; but investigation will generally cause 
apparent conflicts to disappear when due weight is 
given to material circumstances which distinguish 
the cases. If the evident intent and general operation 
of the tax legislation is to adjust the burden with a 
fair and reasonable degree of equality, the constitu-
tional requirement is satisfied. We think the provi-
sion now under consideration meets this test." 
We submit that the application of the allocation for-
mula is, under the circumstances, justified, and that an un-
fair burden is not imposed on the plaintiff, nor is it denied 
the equal protection granted under the Constitution of the 
United States and of the State of Utah. 
SUMMARY 
lt is respectfully submitted that this brief fully covers 
the objections raised by the plaintiff in its brief, and that 
we have proved each objection to be untenable. The Utah 
Corporation Franchise Tax Act, in our opinion, clearly dele-
gates authority to the State Tax Commission to depart from 
the statutory allocation fraction to apportion the net in-
come fairly and equitably attributable to this State. Such 
authority has been held constitutional in other jurisdictions. 
Because of the change in the plaintiff's accounting 
methods and corporate structure, so that the company 
deemed no gross receipts to have resulted from business done 
in this State, this commission had sufficient evidence before 
it to find that there were actually gross receipts. Such find-
ings clearly justified it in departing from the statutory 
allocation fraction and in turn calculating a new allocation 
fraction using three factors; namely, (1) tangible property 
in Utah, which is a part of the statutory formula; (2) sal-
aries and wages payable in Utah, which also is a part of the 
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statutory formula; and (3) receipts from products manu-
factured or produced in Utah. The adoption of such a for-
mula was not unreasonable nor arbitrary and, according 
to legal authorities, did not deprive this plantiff of its prop-
erty without due process of law. On the other hand, we have 
shown that it apportioned the net income of this company 
from operations in Utah fairly and equitably to this State. 
We submit that where a taxpayer, as in the instant 
case, claims that the allocation formula adopted by the tax 
commission deprives it of its property, it must submit evi-
dence and facts to show that the adoption of such a formula 
violates its rights, and it must then go forward in proving 
that such a method is unconstitutional. We submit that the 
plaintiff herein did not, nor has to the present time, fur-
nished one iota of evidence to sustain this burden, and that 
having failed to sustain such burden, it cannot now com-
plain that the formula, as adopted by the commission, is 
unreasonable or arbitrary. 
Lastly, it is our contention that intangible property 
held by the plaintiff in a New York Office resulted from its 
main business operations, and that having resulted from 
such operations, it is incidental thereto. In the same manner 
in which the operations of the company are apportioned to 
the respective states in which it does business, so should the 
income from intangibles resulting from those operations 
be apportioned. In this manner an equitable result is reached 
and a just apportionment made. The apportioning of such 
income, we submit, is not unconstitutional. 
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Therefore, under the facts as disclosed by the record in 
this case, and the established rules of law and authorities 
herein cited, the decision of the State Tax Commission 
should be sustained by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALFRED KLEIN, 
GRANT A. BROWN, 
ALVIN I. SMITH, 
Attorneys for Defendwnt. 
